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M THE SUPREME COURT OF 
iHE STATE OF UTAH 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE, 
Petitioner and Appellant, ; 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent, ] 
Case No. 
14466 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
! NATURE OF THE CASE 
•This case involves the validity of a use tax deficiency 
assessed against Husky Oil Company by the State Tax Coirmission. 
•Hie Court is asked to resolve a question about the application of 
the isolated and occasional sales exemption to a transaction 
whereby a seller regularly engaged in retail sales transfers 
personal property of a type not sold in its regular business. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The State Tax Crarcrdssion determined a use tax deficiency 
against Husky Oil Cortpany of Delaware in the amount of $30,375.00, 
plus interest, for the purchase of a refinery fron Gulf Oil Ltd. 
of Canada. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, State Tax Commission seeks affirmance of the 
use tax deficiency against the Petitioner of $30,375,00, plus 
interest thereon as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts and a 
Supplemental Stipulation of Facts which the Tax Cannission 
considered in making written findings. References are to the 
Tax Commission's Findings of Fact. 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware, a foreign corporation 
doing business in Utah, purchased a reformer from Gulf Oil Ltd., 
of Canada through its parent corporation, Husky Oil Ltd. of Canada, 
(Fd. No. 2). A reformer is a refining device used for making 
gasoline, (Fd. No. 7). 
Gulf Oil Company, the seller, sells oil and gas at wholesale 
and at retail in Canada (Fd. No. 3). Gulf Oil Company does not 
hold itself out as a seller of reformers but does sell its own 
reformers when they become economically obsolescent (Fd. No. 4). 
The reformer in question became available for sale as a result of 
Gulf's dismantling and moving the refinery to a new, modernized 
location. 
After purchasing the reformer, Husky Oil Company 
caused it to be delivered and placed into operation at its Salt Lake 
County refinery. No sales or use tax has been collected by any 
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State as a result of the purchase (Fd. No. 10). 
POINT I 
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE, ONLY 
PERSONS NOT RETAILERS OR NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS 
QUALIFY FOR AN EXEMPTION FROM THE SALES AND USE 
TAXES. 
The use tax is imposed on "the storage, use or other 
consumption in this State of tangible personal property purchased 
for storage, use or other consumption in this State." Section 59-
16-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Appellant does not dispute that 
the property in question was purchased for use in this State, but 
rather claims that the transaction is exempt from use tax. 
It has been established that in deciding whether a 
transaction cones within the scope of the use tax provisions or 
is exempt therefrom, reference may be made to the sales tax 
provisions. There is a liability for use tax if the transaction, 
had it taken place in Utah, would have been subject to sales tax. 
Further, there would be an exemption from use tax if, had it taken 
place in Utah, there would have been an appropriate sales tax 
exemption. The two statutes "are to be considered correlative and 
complimentary, and so far as exemptions are concerned, legislative 
created specific exemptions from the sales tax are also to be 
treated as exemptions from the use tax." Geneva Steel CO. v. State 
Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949) at 209 P.2d 208, 
p. 210, reaffirming Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Com-
mission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947). 
The applicable sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953) are as follows: 
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Section 59-15-4. From and after the effective 
date of this act there is levied and there shall be 
collected and paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property made within the state of Utah 
equivalent to four per cent of the purchase price 
paid or charged, except that where a person takes, 
as a trade-in for part payment of the merchandise 
sold, tangible personal property other than money, • 
that tax shall be computed and paid only upon the 
net difference between the selling price of the 
merchandise sold and the amount of the trade-in 
allowance. The sale of coal, fuel oil and other 
fuels shall not be subject to the tax except as 
hereinafter provided. 
Section 59-15-2. Definitions 
(e) * * * The term "retail sale" means every 
sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or 
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except sales 
defined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted 
by the terms of this act; but the term "retail 
sale" is not intended to include isolated nor 
occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged 
in business, . . . . 
This latter section of the Sales Tax Act states, very 
simply, that a sale made by one who does not regularly engage in 
business will not be taxed. Thus, sales made by one who is in the 
business of making retail sales is subject to the tax. No 
distinction is made in the statute about the type of business the 
taxpayer is in or the type of property he is selling. As counsel 
for the Respondent urged at the hearing below, the exenption 
should apply to situations such as a garage sale where a house-
wife disposes of an old refrigerator or sane other situation where 
one who is not in business and does not regularly make retail 
sales, makes a sale of personal property. 
Husky argues that, to the contrary, the exenption for 
isolated and occasional sales was intended to apply to retailers 
and wholesalers who make a sale which is not part of the regular 
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course of their business. In support of this reading of the 
statute they point to the definitions of retailer and wholesaler, 
which provide that only those doing a "regularly organized" 
wholesale or retail business are subject to the sales tax. Sections 
59-15-2(c) and (e) , Utah Code Annotated (1953). Thus, the argument 
goes, only retailers or wholesalers regularly organized can make 
taxable retail sales in the first place, and, therefore, a housewife 
Or other non-business seller does not need the exemption for isolated 
or occasional sales because those transactions are not subject to 
the sales tax. Therefore, Appellant concludes, the exemption has 
no meaning and is surplusage if it applies only to non-business 
sellers who are not taxed anyway. 
This interpretation of the statute clearly flies in the 
face of its plain language. The statute siirply says the same thing 
two different ways, obviously for emphasis or clarity. The logic 
of the statutory provisions can be stated thus: (1) Only retail 
sales are taxed; (2) retail sales are those Hfca&e by a retailer or 
wholesaler; (3) a retailer or wholesaler is a person doing a regu-
larly organized retail or wholesale business; but, (4) an isolated 
or occasional sale by a person not engaged in business is not 
intended to be a retail sale. 
These provisions are not inconsistent, and they are not 
ambiguous. Fundamentally, they present two obvious cases when a 
sales tax liability would not arise: (1) When the seller is not 
a retailer or a wholesaler, and (2) when a seller not engaged in 
business makes an isolated or occasional sale. Respondent believes 
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that all cases relied upon by Appellant clearly fall into one or 
the other of these two situations and that Appellant hiinself does 
not qualify for either. 
It is for certain that the Legislature did not say that 
isolated and occasional sales of items which a retailer does not 
regularly or often sell will be exempted from taxation. If the 
Legislature had so intended, it would have been a simple matter 
to enact such an exemption. 
Nevertheless, Appellant urges the Court to adopt such 
an interpretation. In response, Respondent would urge that as a 
matter of statutory construction, it is universally held that an 
exenption from taxation is to be construed very strictly and that 
all doubts should be resolved in favor of taxation and against 
exenption. This Court has been guided by that principle since it 
was announced in Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1961), 
wherein this Court states the following: 
• * * * When, therefore, an owner claims that 
certain property is exempt from taxation, 
the burden is upon him to show that it falls 
within the exception. And an exemption will 
not be aided by judicial interpretation. It 
must be shown to exist by express terms of 
the enactment which, it is claimed grants it. 
The presunption is that all exemptions 
intended to be granted were granted in express 
terms. In such cases the rule of strict 
construction applies, and, in order to relieve 
any species of property from its due and just 
proportion of the burdens of the government, 
the language relied on, as creating the 
exenption, should be so clear as not to actaiit 
of reasonable controversy about its meaning, 
for all doubts must be resolved against the 
exenption. 
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It is not disputed that Gulf Oil of Canada is a regularly 
organized wholesaler and retailer and regularly makes such sales . 
therefore, under the plain meaning of the statute it would not 
qualify for an isolated and occasional sale exemption from the 
sales tax in Utah, even though it does not sell refineries as its 
primary product. That exemption is therefore unavailable to Appel-
lant, and the Commission's assessment of use tax was proper. 
POINT II. 
UTAH CASE LAW HAS NOT EXTENDED THE ISOLATED 
AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION TO A PURCHASE 
SUCH AS WAS MADE BY HUSKY OIL. 
Appellant cites Geneva Steel v. State Tax Commission, 
116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949), to support its contention that 
the exemption in question is designed to free retailers and whole-
salers who are selling something other than their regular product 
frcm a sales tax obligation. In Geneva Steel, the War Assets Adminis-
tration sold their entire steel producing operations in Utah to 
Geneva Steel Company. The company maintained that they were exempt 
from the use tax since the sale was within the isolated and occasional 
sale exemption. 
Although the Court observed that the sale of an entire 
business is an isolated and occasional sale under the tax regulations 
of most states, it did not hold that the exemption applies in Utah to 
any sale of something other than the tangible personal property usually 
sold by a retailer or wholesaler. The Tax Commission argued that, in 
any event, the War Assets Administration had sold six other integrated 
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businesses in Utah between the end of World Ifer II and the hearing 
in 1949. The sale of an entire business seemed to be part of the 
sellers regular course of business. 
In response to the argument that the exemption was inappli-
cable for that reason. The Court explained the basis for its con-
clusion that this sale was within the scope of the exemption. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the War Assets 
Administration makes retail sales as defined by our 
sales tax act when it sells surplus items of 
government property . . . , it is not making a 
"retail sale11 when it sells an integrated business 
to a new operator. The very nature and character 
of the two types of sales is radically different. 
The sale of a truck or a raft involves the simple 
exchange of an article of tangible personal 
property for a unit price. But the sale of an 
integrated business for a lump sum price is a 
complex transaction for it contemplates the 
exchange of real property as well as personal 
property, tangibles and intangibles, without 
regard as to what amount is being paid for real 
property, personal property, tangibles, or 
intangibles. * * * We do not mean to imply 
that a person can avoid paying the tax on the 
sale of an article of personal property justly 
1
 due by combining it with the sale of real 
property for a lump sum price. We only hold 
the legislature did not intend to tax the sale 
of personal property transferred as a component 
part of the sale of an integrated business. 
209 P.2d at 213 (Emphasis added.) 
The Court pointed out in the above case that the sale 
of an integrated business involves the transfer of real as well as 
personal property, tangible as well as intangibles. It is not a 
retail sale of tangible property as contenplated by the Sales Tax 
Act. For this reason the Court classifies it as an isolated and 
occasional sale by a person not regularly engaged in business. 
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In L, A. Young Sons Construction Company v. State Tax 
Ctomission, 23 Utah 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) , the other major Utah 
case upon which the Appellant relies, the Court held that the pur-
chase of construction equipment in Wyoming by a Utah cotpany fell 
within the isolated and occasional sale exemption applied to the 
use tax. Of primary significance is the Court's observation that 
the seller, a construction company, "has never been engaged in the 
business of selling construction equipment nor in itaking retail sales," 
23 Utah at 85. Simply speaking, the seller was not a retailer and 
the sale was thus not subject to the sales tax. 
A company which is not in the business of making retail 
sales is properly exempted from the sales tax when, on an isolated 
occasion, it does make such a sale. L. A, Construction holds nothing 
more. It is thus distinguishable from the case at hand where the 
seller, Gulf Oil, is a retailer, and for that reason the exaction 
is unavailable to the Appellant. 
It can only be concluded that except in the special situation 
of the sale of an entire business to a single buyer, an occasional 
sale can only be made by a non-retailer, or a person not engaged in 
business. Appellant and the cases it relies upon are not in point. 
POINT III 
IT IS MISLEADING TO LOOK TO THE LAW OF OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS FOR THE MEANING OF THE UTAH 
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION. 
The Appellant has quite properly submitted that "the 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court control this case and there 
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is no need to look to the law of other state jurisdictions." 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 14) Nevertheless, several cases from other 
jurisdictions are cited to aid the Court in construing the Utah 
law. A rev iew of the law of other states reveals a variety of 
statutory provisions and judicial constructions of isolated or 
occasional sales tax exemptions having little relation to each 
other. 
The Appellant's citation of Big Three Industries Inc. 
v. Keystone Industries, Inc., 472 S.W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civil Appeals 
1971), illustrates the misunderstanding which easily arises when 
judicial interpretations of one state's law are offered to establish 
the meaning of another state's statute. The Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals held that their occasional salesexemption was designed to 
apply to sales by retailers of items not regularly sold in the course 
of business. The Texas Court noted that if the exemption were con-
strued to apply to non-retailers, it would be surplusage as the tax 
by definition applies to retailers alone. The Appellant has made a 
similar argument about the Utah statute. 
There are, however, crucial differences between the 
Texas statute and the Utah statute, which make a superficial 
•'•/Cases from many jurisdictions on isolated or occasional 
sales exemptions are compiled in an annotation at 
42 A.L.R. 3d 292. The author concludes that "the 
exemption of isolated or occasional sales depends 
primarily upon the statutory language and the judicial 
construction of specific terms," and that "statutory 
language and judicial interpretation are not uniform." 
42 A.L.R. 3d at 295-296. 
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comparison of the two misleading. The Utah statute provides for 
an isolated and occasional sale exemption in the section which 
defines "retailer11 and "retail sale." As noted earlier, the 
intended construction of that section is singularly important to 
its understanding. The Texas statute includes an isolated and 
occasional sale exemption in a separate section with very different 
wording. Exempted sales are limited to: 
"one (1) or two (2) sales of tangible personal 
property at retail during any twelve month 
period by a person who does not hold himself 
out as engaging (or who does not habitually 
engage) in the business of selling such 
personal property." 
Article 20.01(F), Title 122 A revised, Civil 
Statutes of Texas. (Emphasis added.) 
The Texas Court stated quite explicitly that the phrase 
wsuch personal property," absent from our statute, indicated that 
the exemption applies when a retailer sells scraething other than the 
product he holds himself out as selling or habitually sells. Their 
decision and their rationale for reading Texas law as they did are 
inapposite to the interpretation of the Utah Sales Tax Act* 
The purpose and scope of the isolated and occasional sales 
exemption are matters of Utah law. It is unhelpful and misleading 
to look to the tax law of other jurisdictions for the meaning of our 
own statutes. 
POINT IV. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION REXSULATIOSf S-38 IS 
A VALID INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY 
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION AND 
WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO HUSKY OIL. 
The State Tax Commission has been delegated authority 
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by the Legislature "to prescribe, adopt and enforce regulations" 
relating to the administration of "the Sales Tax Act and the Use 
Tax Act." Sections 59-15-20, 59-16-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Rule S-38(d) was promulgated to regulate the isolated and occasional 
sale exemptions. This rule is consistent with the plain meaning of 
the statute and Utah case law on the subject. 
Rule S-38: 
* * * 
" (d) Isolated or 'occasional sales made by 
persons not regularly engaged in business are 
not subject to the tax. The word 'business' 
refers to an enterprise engaged in selling 
tangible personal property or taxable services 
notwithstanding the fact that the sales may be 
few or infrequent. No sale of tangible personal 
property made by a person licensed to collect 
sales tax is considered to be isolated or occasional 
even though the tangible personal property was used 
by the seller in his regular business prior to the 
sale. However, any sale of an entire business is 
not deemed to be a taxable sale and no tax will 
apply to the sale of any assets made part of such 
a sale (with the exception of vehicles subject to 
registration) provided that the entire business 
is sold to a single buyer." 
• i •' .'• 
Rule S-38(d) provides that only sales of tangible personal 
property made by a person not licensed to collect sales taxes will be 
exempted. Of course, all those who are engaging in a regularly organ-
ized retail business will be licensed to collect the tax. This rule 
is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, that 
only those not regularly engaged in business are exempted from the 
sales tax. 
By expressly providing that the sale of an entire business 
to a single buyer is per se isolated and occasional, the Tax Commission 
has recognized the unique nature of such a sale, as did this Court in 
Geneva Steel. 
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This rule, like any regulation promulgated by a state 
agency with authority to enforce the lav; is entitled to a presump-
tion of correctness. In McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 
238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963), the petitioner appealed the decision of 
the State Land Board denying his application for oil and gas leases* 
Their denial was based upon a regulation which he maintained was in 
conflict with the applicable statute. 
The Court began its examination of the regulations 
stating: 
"First let us consider whether the rules 
and regulations of the State Land Board were 
so repugnant to the statute as to be contra-
dictory and irreconcilable therewith." 
381 P.2d at 730. 
Later they observed that, whenever possible, administrative regula-
tions should be construed to harmonize with the statutes they inter-
pret and enforce. 
An administrative regulation does not lose its presurrption 
of correctness siirtply because it is more restrictive than an earlier 
regulation of the same siibject natter. Prior to the prcmulgation of 
Rule S-38, the State Tax Commission had applied the isolated and 
occasional sale exemption to any sale not made in the regular course 
of a retailerfs or wholesaler's business. 
It was noted in Reaveley v. Public Service Commission, 20 
Utah 2d 137, 436 P.2d 797, 800 (1968), that administrative agencies 
are not bound by rules of stare decisis applied to courts and are 
free to depart from prior determinations of policy. That the State 
Tax Conmission reconsidered its view of the scope of the exemption 
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in question does not alter its validity. This Court, of course, 
and not the agency, has the final duty to say what the law is 
regardless of the duration or the alteration of an interpretative 
administrative ruling. 
Rule S-38 is a reasonable application of the isolated and 
occasional sales exemption in the Sales Tax Act and is consistent 
with judicial construction of the exeitption. Its enforcement 
against Husky Oil by the State Tax Commission should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the plain meaning of the statute, only those not 
retailers or not regularly engaged in business are eligible for the 
isolated and occasional sales exemption from the sales and use taxes. 
Because Husky Oil purchased its reformer from a seller who regularly 
engages in retail and wholesale transactions, that purchase is not 
exempted from the use tax. The State Tax Commission's assessment of 
a $30,375.00 use tax deficiency, together with interest thereon as 
provided by law, was proper and should be upheld by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. RQMSEY 
Attorney General 
G. Blaine Davis 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN R. RANDLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Dated this 30th day of June, 1976. 
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